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Tax-Foglesong IV: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT A PER-
SONAL SERVICE CORPORATION AND ITS SOLE SHAREHOLDER/EMPLOYEE
Do NOT CONSTITUTE Two SEPARATE ORGANIZATIONS, TRADES, OR
BUSINESSES UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.
Foglesong v. Commissioner 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982)
In Foglesong v. Commissioner' the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals once again reversed the Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer
and his personal service corporation did not constitute two sepa-
rate organizations, trades, or businesses, as required to justify a
reallocation of income under Internal Revenue Code section 482.2
Foglesong is the latest in a series of cases dealing with the
proper allocation of income between a personal service corporation
and its sole shareholder/employee. Its result constitutes a victory
for taxpayers seeking to take advantage of tax benefits not availa-
ble to sole proprietors.
The Foglesong case began in 1976 with a Tax Court Memoran-
dum decision.3 The taxpayer, a chemical engineer, was for fourteen
years engaged in sales operations as an employee of Babcock &
Wilcox Company. In 1962 the taxpayer left Babcock & Wilcox in
order to enter into sales agreements with two tube supply compa-
nies: Pittsburgh Tube Company and Plymouth Tube." Pursuant to
this agreement, taxpayer's duties included "servicing existing cus-
tomers, soliciting new business, responding to technical questions
concerning steel tubing, negotiating orders for customers, and dis-
tributing the companies' promotional material." 5
In 1966, on the advice of his accountant, the taxpayer organized
Foglesong Company with an initial capitalization of $1,000 in com-
mon stock and $400 in preferred.' The common stock was distrib-
uted 98% to Foglesong, 1% to his wife, and 1% to his accountant.7
1. 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
2. I.R.C. § 482 (1982) provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Sec-
retary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or
allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he deter-
mines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organiza-
tions, trades, or businesses.
3. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976). [hereinafter cited as Fogle-
song I].
4. Id. at 1310.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Neither the wife nor the accountant paid any consideration for these shares.
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Foglesong's four minor children received the preferred stock.8 The
sums in payment of the stock were remitted directly by the tax-
payer to Foglesong Company.9
Following incorporation, the taxpayer notified both Pittsburgh
Tube and Plymouth Tube of the existence of Foglesong Company
and requested that his sales agreement with each company be
amended to reflect that Foglesong Company, rather than Fogle-
song himself, would render sales services to the tubing compa-
nies.10 Both manufacturers agreed to this change, although it was
not until several years later that contractual changes reflecting this
agreement were actually effectuated.1" During the interim, how-
ever, all commissions from both tubing companies were remitted
directly to Foglesong Company. 2
The Commissioner determined a deficiency.13 At trial the tax-
payer testified that he wanted to incorporate his business to obtain
the limited liability protection of the corporate structure and to
provide a better vehicle for his planned business expansion into
new ventures."' It became clear, however, that the taxpayer did not
in fact expand his sales business. 15 Significantly however, Fogle-
song Company did pay all of the taxpayer's business expenses,
carry its own insurance coverage, maintain a corporate automobile,
and comply with the formalities of New Jersey state corporation
law.16 Further, Foglesong Company "adopted bylaws, held an ini-
tial meeting of the board of directors at which officers were elected,
and conducted periodic board of directors' and stockholders' meet-
ings as required by its bylaws.' 7 Although the taxpayer did not
enter into any written employment contract or execute a non-com-
petition agreement with Foglesong Company, he nevertheless
worked exclusively for the corporation. 8
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1310-11. The taxpayer contacted the respective tubing companies by letter or
in person during August and September of 1966.
11. Id. at 1311.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1309. The Commissioner asserted deficiencies against both the Foglesongs and
Foglesong Company.
14. Id. at 1311.
15. Id. "Subsequent to the formation of Foglesong Co., petitioner interviewed a prospec-
tive salesman to help him in the New England area, but these negotiations were unsuccess-
ful." Id. The corporation did hire a secretary. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865, 872 (7th Cir. 1980).
1983] FOGLESONG IV
Between the tax years ending August 31, 1967 and August 31,
1970, Foglesong Company's annual gross receipts averaged approx-
imately $138,000.' 9 Out of this, the corporation paid compensation
to the taxpayer averaging approximately $59,000 per annum.20
Taxpayer, however, received no salary for the first four months of
operation.2' Foglesong Company also opened a stock brokerage ac-
count in 1967, maintaining stock investments of between approxi-
mately $35,000 and $92,000 between 1967 and 1970.22 During these
years, the corporation paid dividends on the preferred stock to the
taxpayer's children in the amount of $38,000.23 No dividends were
paid on the common stock of Foglesong Company.24 In Foglesong
I, the Tax Court noted that "[fin actual practice, as president of
the corporation and chairman of the board of directors, all deci-
sions regarding the payment of dividends were made solely by the
[taxpayer]."2 5
History
In Foglesong I the Internal Revenue Service argued that the in-
come reported by Foglesong Company was in reality income
earned by Foglesong himself."6 The Service contended that "under
the broad scope of section 6127 and the assignment of income doc-
19. Foglesong I, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1311.
20. Id.
21. Id. Although Foglesong Company had funds to compensate the taxpayer, the sole
motive in drawing no salary from the corporation seems to have been to hold down tax
liability for that year.
22. Id. at 1311.
23. Id. at 1312. These dividends apparently were paid from the income attributable to
the stock investments. Id. at 1311.
24. Id. at 1311.
25. Id. at 1312.
26. Id.
27. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1982) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from
whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items: (1)
Compensation for services, including fees, commissions and similar items; (2)
Gross income derived from business; (3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest; (5) Rents; (6) Royalties; (7) Dividends; (8) Alimony and separate
maintenance payments; (9) Annuities; (10) Income from life insurance and endow-
ment contracts; (11) Pensions; (12) Income from discharge of indebtedness; (13)
Distributive share of partnership gross income; (14) Income in respect of a dece-
dent; and (15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
For a discussion of the application of section 61 asssignment of income principles prior to
the Foglesong IV decision, see Battle, The Use of Corporations by Persons Who Perform
Services to Gain Tax Advantages, 57 TAxEs 797, 803 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Battle];
Lyon and Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit of the Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake
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trine of Lucas v. Earl,28 such income should properly be taxed to
[Foglesong personally] ".29
The court held that the taxpayer's primary motive in forming
Foglesong Company was to avoid taxes and that control over the
earning of income continued to remain with the taxpayer.30 The
Tax Court concluded that "on balance, tax avoidance considera-
tions far outweighed any genuine business concerns petitioner may
have had in setting up Foglesong Co."3' Consequently, the Tax
Court applied the principles of Lucas v. Earl and rejected Fogle-
song's contention that Foglesong Company, and not he, was the
true party to the tubing sales agreements.3 2
In Foglesong v. Commissioner, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed the Tax Court and remanded the case for further
consideration.33 In reaching this decision, the court placed great
weight on the following factors:
(1) the Corporation and not the taxpayer is the party to the con-
tracts under which services are performed, (2) the Corporation is
recognized to be a viable, taxable entity and not a mere sham, (3)
non-tax business purposes are present even though tax avoidance
is apparently a major concern, (4) the Corporation has not been
formed for the purpose of taking advantage of losses incurred in a
separate trade or business, (5) the corporate form (and the status
of the Corporation as an actual operating enterprise) has been
consistently honored by the taxpayer and other parties to the
Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 393 (1962).
28. 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (husband's entire earnings were taxable to him despite an agree-
ment with his wife that their incomes would be divided equally). See also Battle, supra note
27, at 803-05.
29. Foglesong I, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1312 (citations omitted). The Tax Court noted that
"[w]here, as here, the corporation involved is admittedly a separate taxable entity and not a
mere sham, the issue has generally narrowed to whether the corporation has been given
sufficient corporate substance and sufficient control over the earning of the income so that
it, and not the individual taxpayer, can be considered the true earner of the income." Id.
See generally FED. TAX CO-ORDINATOR 2D, G-4009-4011 (RIA 1982).
30. Foglesong I, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1313. Several factors were pointed to by the court
as affecting its decision: (1) no dividends were paid on the common stock of Foglesong Com-
pany, although such dividends were paid on the preferred stock held by the taxpayer's chil-
dren; (2) Foglesong himself could decide, in his sole discretion, when and in what amount
dividends would be paid; (3) the taxpayer failed to receive a salary from Foglesong Com-
pany for the first four months of operation, although he continued to perform under the
contracts with the tubing companies and (4) earnings generated by the taxpayer prior to the
creation of Foglesong Company were nevertheless paid directly to Foglesong Company,
rather than to the taxpayer.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1315.
33. 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Foglesong II].
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transaction giving rise to the income, (6) the taxpayer does not
render services as an employee to any entity other than the Cor-
poration, (7) the Corporation is not disqualified from performing
the Services required of it by contract because the law requires
these services to be performed by an individual, (8) the entities
paying or providing the income are not controlled or dominated
by the taxpayer, and (9) . . . other and more appropriate legal
bases exist for attacking apparent tax avoidance than broadscale
disregard of the corporate form through application of assignment
of income theory. 4
Viewing these factors, the court determined that it is "inappro-
priate to attempt to weigh 'business purposes' against 'tax avoid-
ance motives' in determining whether the assignment of income
doctrine of Lucas v. Earl should apply, in effect, to substantially
disregard the corporate form." 5
Although the Seventh Circuit found it unnecessary to "crack
walnuts with a sledgehammer", the court did suggest an alterna-
tive method of attack for the Service:
In the instant case, Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code ap-
pears available to allocate among controlled taxpayers 'gross in-
come, deductions, credits, or allowances' to prevent evasion of
taxes or to clearly reflect the income of the controlled taxpay-
ers. . . . We, therefore, remand to the Tax Court for considera-
tion of the issues surrounding the Commissioner's claim under
Section 482 and other claims available.3 6
On remand, the Tax Court considered the application of section
482 in Foglesong v. Commissioner.3 7 The taxpayer maintained that
section 482 was inapplicable to him because he was a corporate
employee, and not an "organization, trade, or business" as re-
quired for the application of that section.3 8 The Tax Court dis-
agreed, noting that "[blecause the petitioner as an employee and
the corporation are separate taxable entities and separate trades or
34. Id. at 868-69 (footnotes omitted).
35. Id. at 869. The court also noted that with respect to the sales agreement, there had
not only been an assignment, but a novation. Id. at 870. Consequently, the court concluded
that "[hiere not only the fruit but the tree itself was transferred to the Corporation" and so
declined to apply Lucas v. Earl. The court also found that the absence of a written employ-
ment contract or a covenant not to compete was less meaningful than the fact that the
taxpayer did in fact work exclusively for the corporation. Id. at 872.
36. Id. at 872-73.
37. 77 T.C. 1102 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Foglesong Il1].
38. Id. at 1104.
19831
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businesses, we hold that under the facts presented herein, the
threshold requirement of section 482, that there be at least two
organizations, trades, or businesses, is met."' 88
The taxpayer argued further that even if section 482 was appli-
cable, it could be applied only to reallocate income earned by him
prior to incorporation but paid to Foglesong Company, and to divi-
dends paid to his children.40 The Tax Court found that "[tihe
standard against which we must test arbitrariness of the [Commis-
sioner's] determination is whether and to what extent actual deal-
ings between the petitioner and the corporation reflect arm's-
length dealings between two uncontrolled parties."4 1
In holding section 482 applicable, the Tax Court noted that the
taxpayer's primary motive for incorporating was the avoidance of
federal income taxes by splitting sales commission income between
himself and Foglesong Company. s Although observing that there
were bona fide reasons, other than tax avoidance, for incorporat-
ing, the court found that "just because the petitioner and the cor-
poration are separate taxable entities does not mean the manner
by which Petitioner, as controlling shareholder, chooses to allocate
income between them should be given tax effect. Before we will
accept petitioner's allocation, it must reflect arm's-length
dealing. '4 3
Looking to the facts of the case, the Tax Court determined that
the taxpayer's dealings with the corporation were not at arm's
length. "Had petitioner been dealing at arm's length with the cor-
poration, his salary and benefits would not have so substantially
deviated from his worth to the corporation."44
Foglesong IV
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit45 once again reversed the deci-
39. Id. (citing Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1105.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1106. Specifically, the court found that had the taxpayer not incorporated, he
would have realized additional total compensation of $212,000 for the period 1966 through
1969. Id. For a discussion of Foglesong II and its perceived impact under section 482 upon
personal service corporations see Burdett, Foglesong's Sec. 482 Approach May Threaten
Closely-Held Personal Service Corporations, 53 J. TAx. 330 (1980); McFadden, Section 482
and the Professional Corporation: The Foglesong Case, 8 J. CORP. TAx. 35 (1981).
45. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Fogle-
song IV].
FOGLESONG IV
sion of the Tax Court and remanded the case for further consider-
ation. At the outset, the court stated that "[tihe crux of the case is
whether the taxpayer and his personal service corporation consti-
tute two 'organizations, trades, or businesses'" as required for a
reallocation under section 482."'
In determining that the provisions of section 482 should be
broadly applied,4 the court noted that section 482 has been ap-
plied when a taxpayer seeks to offset the profits of one business
with the losses of another, 48 and "when an individual engages in a
business that is distinct from or in addition to the business in
which [his] personal service corporation is engaged."'49 The Sev-
enth Circuit observed that "[imn recent decisions, however, the Tax
Court has gone beyond this to hold that section 482 is designed 'to
cover any type of entity or enterprise which has independent tax
significance,' when evasion of taxes is perceived." 50 The result of
such decisions was that under the Tax Court approach a corpora-
tion and its sole shareholder/employee could constitute two sepa-
rate trades or businesses under section 482, even when the share-
holder/employee devoted no time or effort to other businesses.,1
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court's interpreta-
tion of section 482.52
The Tax Court in large part seems to have based its broad read-
ing [of section 482] on the statement in a Congressional commit-
tee report that the provision was designed to encompass "all
kinds of business activity." The Tax Court did not consider the
statement in context, however. The committee made the remark
in explaining why it was adding "organizations" to "trade or busi-
nesses": "While it is believed that the language of the present law
is broad enough to include 'organizations,' this word is added to
remove any doubt as to the application of this section to all kinds
of business activity."'
46. Id. at 850. (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966)).
49. Id. (citing Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
933, reh. denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969)).
50. Foglesong IV at 850-51 (quoting Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1022 (1981)).
51. Id. For a discussion of several Tax Court cases relating to the application of section
482 to personal service corporations see Comment, Reallocation of Personal Service Corpo-
ration Income: A Trilogy of Tax Court Cases, 14 CONN. L. REv. 819 (1982).
52. Id. at 851.
53. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934) (citation omitted)).
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Thus, the Seventh Circuit found that the addition of the word
"organizations" was not intended to include the case of a personal
service corporation and its sole shareholder/employee. 5 4 "[W]e be-
lieve that it is appropriate to hold that an individual who does not
work exclusively for his personal service corporation may have the
income earned by it allocated to him under section 482. The sec-
tion should not apply, however, to one who does work exclusively
for his corporation." 66
The court went on to distinguish several other prominent cases
in the area of reallocation of income between personal service cor-
porations and employee/shareholders. In Borge v. Commissioner,6
a well-known entertainer transferred the assets of his unsuccessful
poultry business to a corporation. The taxpayer then entered into
an agreement with that corporation wherein he agreed to work for
his corporation as an entertainer. The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the dual business requirement was met because
"Borge was in the business of entertaining. He was not devoting
his time and energies to the corporation; he was carrying on his
career as an entertainer, and merely channeling a part of his en-
tertainment income through the corporation. '"5 1
The Seventh Circuit distinguished Foglesong from Borge in sev-
eral ways. In Foglesong: both the taxpayer and his corporation
were engaged in the same business; the taxpayer was engaged in no
outside business; the corporation, rather than the taxpayer himself,
was paid for the services; and there was no attempt to offset the
gains of one business with the losses of another."
The Seventh Circuit also distinguished Ach v. Commissioner59
from Foglesong. In Ach, the taxpayer (Pauline) ran a successful
dress business while her husband and son jointly operated a losing
dairy business. In 1952 the father and son ceased operations of the
dairy business, sold the dairy equipment and leased the business
land and improvements." The following year, the "dairy" corpora-
tion changed its name to the Ach Corporation and its business to
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 405 F.2d 673.
57. Id. at 676. The court also noted that Borge received $50,000 per year from the corpo-
ration for his services. Id. at 675. The court concluded that "Borge obviously would not have
entered into such a contract with an unrelated party." Id.
58. Foglesong IV, at 852.
59. 42 T.C. 114. For a more thorough analysis of Ach and Borge and the relation of these
cases to section 482, see Battle, supra note 27, at 805-06.
60. 42 T.C. at 117.
FOGLESONG IV
"general business," as permitted under state law." Pursuant to his
parents' suggestion, the son transferred 149 of the 300 shares of
Ach Corporation common stock then outstanding (of which the son
owned all) to his brother, Laurence. 2 Subsequently, Pauline, then
60 years of age, became president, treasurer, and chairman of the
board of directors of Ach Corporation although she then held none
of the corporate stock."s On that same date Pauline sold her dress
business to the corporation, although she continued to manage the
business.6 4 There was no name change and no payments were made
to Pauline by the corporation." Neither of the taxpayer's sons ac-
tually participated in the day-to-day activities of the dress busi-
ness, but maintained their own separate enterprises.6
In 1956 the taxpayer's husband died. 7 At that time, the corpora-
tion was indebted to him in the amount of $232,390 for notes pre-
viously executed to cover dairy losses."5 Payments were made on
these notes out of the profits of the dress business and were desig-
nated by the corporation as "payment of indebtedness" and used
to offset income from the dress business.6 9
The Tax Court held that the transaction between the taxpayer
and Ach Corporation was not at arm's length.70 Further, the Tax
Court stated that "it is all too clear to us on this record that Pau-
line was acquiring control of this moribund corporation for the
purpose of attempting to utilize the net operating loss carryover of
the dairy business, to offset the resulting deductions against earn-
ings of her successful dress business, and to obtain the actual bene-
fits of those tax-free earnings by having the corporation pay off,
first, her $30,705.57 note (in payment for the dress business), and
then the notes of some $280,000 held by her husband which were
61. Id.
62. Id. Laurence paid no consideration for the transfer of these shares. Id.
63. Id. at 118.
64. Id. at 118-19.
65. Id. Ach Corp. issued a note in the amount of $30,705.57 to Pauline in payment for
the dress business. Id. at 119.
66. Id. at 119.
67. Id.
68. Id. "During the latter part of 1952, Roger [taxpayer's son] went to his father and
told him that it was time to give up the dairy and creamery business; Roger felt his father
was too old to have to worry about continued losses and the continued backing of a losing
cause." Id. at 117. (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 119-21.
70. Id. at 123. "The corporation was hopelessly insolvent, and it is utterly beyond belief
that any unrelated third party would have sold a prosperous business for a non-interest-
bearing $30,705.57 note of such an insolvent maker" Id.
1983]
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otherwise uncollectable - all of which would be received free of
tax!"7 '
With regard to the application of section 482, the Tax Court
found that "sufficient aspects of the business remained with Pau-
line so as not to deprive her of the status of a separate 'organiza-
tion,' 'trade,' or 'business,' within the meaning of section 482." '7
Further, the court found that "[t]he conclusion is irresistible that
the corporation in fact belonged to her, and that she was actually
the beneficial owner of the stock even prior to the formal transfer
(to her) in 1959. In any event, it is not record ownership, but ac-
tual control, which counts in the application of the statute." 3
In distinguishing Foglesong from Ach, the Seventh Circuit noted
that:
By contrast, Foglesong transferred all of his business to the cor-
poration and retained nothing. The corporation treated him as an
employee, not a sole proprietor, by paying him a salary. Although
he had no employment contract with the corporation, we find his
actual performance - exclusive work for the company - far more
significant than any paper obligation. Finally, unlike Ach, there
was no shifting of profits from one business to another; thus one
of the evils that section 482 was designed to prohibit is not
present.7 4
The court also discussed the case of Rubin v. Commissioner.7 ' In
Rubin, the taxpayer organized one corporation to do business with
another corporation which he also controlled.7 6 The taxpayer
caused one corporation to pay the other corporation "management
fees" for services rendered to it by the controlling shareholder/em-
ployee (Rubin).77 In its first opinion,78 the Tax Court held for the
Service, basing its decision on reallocation principles under Lucas
v. Earl. However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded for a determination of whether section 482 should
be applied.7 9 On remand, the Tax Court, although taking into con-
71. Id. (parenthetical material added).
72. Id. at 125.
73. Id.
74. Foglesong IV at 852 (citing Foglesong II, 621 F.2d at 872).
75. 51 T.C. 251 (1968), rev'd & remanded, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970). The case was
reheard at 56 T.C. 1155 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
76. 56 T.C. at 1156.
77. Id.
78. 51 T.C. 251 (1968).
79. 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970). For a brief discussion of Rubin, see Battle, supra note
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sideration the taxpayer's argument that the Commissioner was
seeking "to increase the salary of a corporate employee" by allocat-
ing corporate income to the shareholder/employee,"' nevertheless
stated that:
[W]e do not today hold that employment status constitutes, in
and of itself, a trade or business within the meaning of section
482. Nor have we ruled that section 482 empowers the Commis-
sioner at will to readjust the salaries of corporate employees. We
merely hold, as is the clear import of both the Ach and Borge
decisions, that where the particular facts of a case are such as to
justify a finding that a shareholder operated an independent
business and merely assigned to the corporation a portion of the
income therefrom, the business activity of the taxpayer may
constitute a trade or business to which allocation of all or part of
the income attributable to his efforts is authorized under section
482.81
The Seventh Circuit, in discussing Rubin, merely stated that
"[tihe court in an earlier ruling in that case noted that taxpayer
performed more than $25,000 worth of other work unrelated to the
work for his controlled corporation. '8 2
Conclusion
In Foglesong IV, the Court of Appeals held that "the Tax Court
erred in its decision that [section 4821 should be applied to allocate
income received by Foglesong's personal service corporation to Fo-
glesong," ' 3 and concluded that "[b]ecause the taxpayer did work
exclusively for the corporation and because there was no shifting of
profits," the judgment of the Tax Court should be reversed. 4
On the strength of Foglesong IV, and at least in the Seventh
Circuit, so long as: (1) the personal service corporation pays its
sole shareholder/employee a salary and benefits commensurate
with an arm's length transaction; (2) the corporate form is ob-
27, at 807.
80. 56 T.C. at 1160.
81. Id. at 1161 (emphasis added). See generally Warren and Dunkle, Professional Cor-
porations-Organization and Operation, TAX MGMT. No. 334, § VII, at A-32 (BNA 1976).
82. Foglesong IV at 853. Although not attempting to distinquish Rubin from Foglesong,
the Seventh Circuit did seem to find this level of other, outside work to be significant. Id. at
852.
83. Id. at 853.
84. Id.
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served; and (3) there is no shifting of losses or profits, neither
section 61's assignment of income principles, nor section 482's real-
location provisions, may be utilized to reallocate or assign income
between a corporation and its sole shareholder/employee. Further,
no written agreement with the corporation seems necessary, at
least so long as the taxpayer works exclusively for the corporation,
although good practice would seem to suggest that such a written
agreement is desirable.
Developments in TEFRA8 5
The Seventh Circuit also observed that in 1982 Congress sought
to legislatively reverse the result in Keller v. Commissioner86 by
amending section 269 of the Code."7 In Keller the Tax Court held
that although the provisions of section 482 are applicable to sole
shareholder personal service corporations, no allocation is required
when the "employee's" compensation reflects an arm's-length
transaction. However, the Foglesong IV court found that the new
provision was not applicable to the tax years in question."
The amendment, incorporated into the Tax Equity & Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act of 1982, provides that if substantially all of the
services of a personal service corporation are performed for (or on
behalf of) one other corporation, partnership, or other entity, and
the principal purpose of forming the personal service corporation is
the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax by taking advantage
of tax incentives not otherwise available, "then the Secretary may
allocate all income, deductions, credits, exclusions, and other al-
lowances between such personal service corporation and its em-
ployee-owners" to prevent the avoidance or evasion of income tax,
85. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Tax Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 250, 96
Stat. 324 [hereinafter cited as TEFRAJ.
86. 77 T.C. 1014 (1981).
87. I.R.C. § 269(a) (West Supp. 1982). Section 269(a) provides that if:
(1) substantially all of the services of a personal service corporation are performed
for (or on behalf of) 1 other corporation, partnership, or other entity, and (2) the
principal purpose for forming, or availing of, such personal service corporation is
the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax by reducing the income of, or se-
curing the benefit of any expense, deduction, credit, exclusion, or other allowance
for, any employee-owner which would not otherwise be available, then the Secre-
tary may allocate all income, deductions, credits, exclusions, and other allowances
between such personal service corporation and its employee-owners, if such alloca-
tion is necessary to prevent avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax or clearly
to reflect the income of the personal service corporation or any of its employee-
owners.
88. Foglesong IV at 851, n. 3.
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or to clearly reflect income.89 Although the Seventh Circuit de-
clined to address the matter, it appears that this provision will not
be applicable to a factual situation such as that present in Fogle-
song because Foglesong Company performed substantially all of its
services for two other corporations, rather than one as provided for
by statute.90 .
Consequently, the amendment appears to be limited to the Kel-
ler situation in which, perhaps, the taxpayer was a little too clever.
Sole shareholder/employees of a personal service corporation in the
Keller position (i.e. substantially all of the services of a personal
service corporation being performed for, or on behalf of, one other
corporation, partnership or other entity) will have a strong incen-
tive to dissolve, or at least to alter the structure of their operation.
The alternative is to risk a finding that the "principal purpose" of
the taxpayer in using the corporate form was the avoidance or eva-
sion of federal income tax. Just how easy [or difficult] it will be for
the Service to establish this "principal purpose" attack remains to
be seen. However, when organizing personal service corporations,
practitioners should pay particular attention to developments
under the amendment.
Although the new provision affecting personal service corpora-
tions contained in TEFRA presents another hurdle to taxpayers, it
is only applicable to tax years beginning after January 1, 1983.
Consequently, the Foglesong decisions will be important in tax liti-
gation for many years to come.
TIMOTHY L. WHALEN
89. I.R.C. § 269(a) (West Supp. 1982).
90. The business of Keller, Inc. was that of providing pathology services as a corporate
partner of MAL (a partnership of pathologists). Keller, Inc. employed Keller to render his
services as a pathologist, with laboratory and technical support provided by MAL, Inc.
(which was controlled by the partners of MAL). Consequently, Keller, Inc. performed sub-
stantially all of its services for one other partnership: MAL. This would seemingly bring the
Keller situation within the ambit of I.R.C. §269(a), while excluding situations such as the
one in Foglesong (because two other entities are involved), as well as the situation in which
the sole shareholder of a personal service corporation renders corporate services to the gen-
eral public.
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